Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, two different—and often confused—legal systems have driven manpower:

  1. Ordinary mandatory conscription (prizyv) — the peacetime-style draft of young men for a fixed 12-month term, run in regular cycles (traditionally spring and autumn). Reuters and other outlets have repeatedly described this as one year of compulsory service.
  2. Mobilization (mobilizatsiya) — an emergency call-up that primarily targets people who are already in the reserve (often after completing prior service). Mobilization is governed by Russia’s mobilization statute, which frames mobilization broadly as a state package of measures to shift the country and institutions onto “wartime footing.”

The Ukraine war made this distinction practically crucial: conscription decides who enters initial service, while mobilization decides who can be recalled (and kept) under wartime-type rules.

Historical background in brief: how the modern framework formed 

Russia’s current architecture is built on a set of post-Soviet federal laws and decrees that existed before 2022, but were tightened and expanded once the war began:

  • 1997 (Mobilization Law): Russia’s mobilization statute defines mobilization preparation/mobilization as a coordinated set of state measures for readiness and transition to wartime conditions.
  • 2002 (Alternative Civilian Service law): Russia’s ACS law recognizes a constitutional pathway for some conscripts to replace military service with civilian labor service, but only within defined categories and procedures.
  • September 2022 (Partial mobilization decree + criminal-code tightening): the Kremlin launched “partial mobilization,” and lawmakers simultaneously escalated criminal exposure for service-related offenses during “mobilization / wartime / armed conflict.”
  • 2023–2024 (age expansion + digital enforcement): Russia expanded the pool eligible for compulsory conscription and built stronger enforcement mechanisms (including electronic summons rules and automatic restrictions).
  • 2025 (procedural expansion proposals): lawmakers backed a bill to make conscription processes year-round (even if intake still clusters in traditional seasons), reflecting sustained manpower pressure from the Ukraine war.

A. Ordinary conscription (the “draft”) 

Purpose: to bring young men into initial service for a set term (commonly described as 12 months).

Who is targeted: men within the statutory conscription age band (now expanded—see below). 

How it works in practice: military commissariats summon eligible men for medical exams, draft commission decisions, and assignment. Russia has also moved toward electronic summons systems and related restrictions.

B. Mobilization (the “recall/war footing” tool) 

Purpose: to rapidly increase manpower by calling up reservists and moving institutions to wartime readiness. The mobilization law’s definition emphasizes readiness and transition measures across state bodies and the economy. 

Who is targeted: primarily those already in the reserve (often after completing conscription or other service). Forum 18 notes that after completing compulsory service, men are enrolled in the reserves and can become subject to mobilization (as occurred in 2022).

A key Ukraine-war feature: under the September 2022 partial mobilization decree, many mobilized personnel were legally treated under contract-style continuity rules. The decree states that contracts continue “until the end of the period of partial mobilization,” with limited dismissal grounds (age limit, health, imprisonment). That “stop-loss” structure is one reason mobilization feels legally different from ordinary conscription: it can change how long someone can be kept in service.

Age limits: mandatory conscription vs. mobilization 

A. Mandatory conscription age (ordinary draft) — 18 to 30 

Russia raised the upper age limit for compulsory conscription from 27 to 30, effective January 1, 2024, according to Reuters coverage of the decree and legislative change. 
Forum 18 likewise describes compulsory service for men between 18 and 30. 

Bottom line: 

B. Mobilization age (“how old can you be and still be recalled?”) — depends on reserve status and rank 

Mobilization is tied to reserve eligibility and rank categories, not the simple “18–30” band. 

Reuters reported a July 2023 law expanding the ages at which reservists can be called up:

  • highest ranks up to 70 (previously 65)
  • other senior ranks up to 65
  • junior officers up to 60
  • “all others” up to 55 (rather than 45)

Some reporting also breaks this down into reserve categories (often described as first/second/third categories with different ceilings for enlisted and junior ranks), reflecting how the reserve system is tiered in practice. 

Bottom line: 

  • Mobilization age is not one number. It can run well beyond 30 and, for many categories, into the 50s–70 range depending on rank and reserve category. 

Alternative civilian service (ACS): available for conscription, unclear for mobilization 

A. ACS under ordinary conscription — yes, in the statute 

Russia’s Alternative Civilian Service law expressly provides that a citizen may replace military service with ACS where military service conflicts with beliefs/religion (or for certain indigenous traditional-lifestyle grounds). 

Critically, CIS Legislation’s translated excerpt states the ACS pathway applies to:

So ACS is structurally built as a conscription-phase substitute—not a reserve/mobilization substitute. 

Forum 18 describes ACS as legally available but often bureaucratically difficult to obtain in practice. 

B. ACS during mobilization — theoretical constitutional right, but no clear mobilization procedure 

Forum 18’s reporting highlights the core problem: although the constitution recognizes conscientious objection, Russia has not adopted a specific federal law enabling ACS “during mobilization.” It also notes 2022 changes that can move people already performing ACS into roles within military organizations as civilian personnel, rather than creating a robust “ACS instead of mobilization” pathway. 

Practical takeaway:

  • During ordinary conscription: ACS is a defined legal mechanism (apply → draft commission decision).
  • During mobilization: the law/policy landscape is far murkier; there is no widely recognized, consistently applied statutory procedure that functions like conscription-phase ACS.

Punishment and enforcement: what happens if someone refuses or avoids service? 

Russia’s legal exposure differs sharply depending on whether the person is (1) a civilian draft-age conscript, or (2) already treated as a servicemember (including mobilized). 

A. Enforcement tools before service: summons + restrictions 

A major post-2022 enforcement development is the move to electronic summons and automatic restrictions. 

The U.S. Library of Congress described a system in which a draft notice can be deemed received after posting, triggering immediate travel restrictions, and after a set period, additional restrictions (transactions, loans, driving privileges, etc.). 

This matters because, even before criminal prosecution, the state can apply administrative pressure and practical life constraints. 

B. Criminal liability for draft evasion (conscription track) 

The Library of Congress notes that evasion of the draft can be prosecuted under Russia’s Criminal Code with penalties including imprisonment up to two years (describing Article 328). 

(In practice, outcomes can vary widely depending on facts, proof of intent, procedural posture, and local enforcement trends.) 

C. Criminal liability once a person is treated as a servicemember (mobilization/war track) 

Once someone is already in uniform—or legally treated like contract personnel due to mobilization—the risk shifts heavily toward “military service crimes,” and penalties became harsher in late 2022.

  1. Unauthorized absence / leaving a unit (Criminal Code Article 337). Consultant.ru’s text shows the 2022 amendments:
    • during mobilization/wartime/armed conflict, absence beyond 2–10 days can be punished by up to 5 years (Art. 337(2.1));
    • beyond 10 days up to 1 month during mobilization can be punished by up to 7 years (Art. 337(3.1));
    • over 1 month during mobilization can be punished by 5 to 10 years (Art. 337(5)).
  2. Desertion (Criminal Code Article 338). Consultant.ru’s text provides:
    • basic desertion: up to 7 years;
    • desertion with weapon / by group: up to 10 years;
    • and if committed during mobilization/wartime/armed conflict: 5 to 15 years (Art. 338(3)).
  3. Disobeying orders / refusing combat participation (Criminal Code Article 332, as amended). TASS (citing publication on the official legal information portal) reported amendments providing:
  4. New/expanded “wartime” offenses (surrender, looting). TASS also described:
    • “Voluntary surrender” (Art. 352.1): 3–10 years, with a limited “release from liability” pathway for first-time offenders under specific conditions;
    • looting: penalties up to 15 years depending on aggravating factors. Meduza summarized the same legislative package, emphasizing the introduction of “mobilization/wartime” as aggravating circumstances and increased maximum penalties for unit abandonment.

D. Why the difference is so stark: “civilian vs servicemember” status 

The partial mobilization decree is relevant here because it reinforced a legal environment where mobilized personnel can be treated like contract servicemembers for continuity and discipline. 
That status shift is what pulls people from “draft evasion” risks into the much harsher “military service crimes” framework.

Examples (how these rules play out)

Example 1: 19-year-old student facing ordinary conscription

Example 2: 29-year-old who wants ACS after aging into the reserve

  • Key issue: ACS is framed as a replacement for conscription and applies to men 18–30 who are not in the reserve.
  • Once a person has completed service and is placed in the reserve, the question becomes mobilization exposure, where a clear “ACS instead of mobilization” procedure is not established in the same way.

Example 3: 44-year-old reservist under mobilization exposure

  • Track: mobilization (reserve recall).
  • Age exposure: could fall within reserve call-up ages that Reuters describes as extending “all others” to 55, junior officers to 60, seniors to 65, highest ranks to 70.
  • If mobilized and later leaves unit: Article 337 penalties can rise sharply in a mobilization/wartime context (up to 10 years depending on duration).

Example 4: Mobilized soldier refuses combat orders 

  • Under the amended Article 332 framework described by TASS, refusal to participate in combat operations can carry 2–3 years, or 3–10 years if it causes grave consequences. 

The Ukraine-war lens: why these laws matter now

Three Ukraine-war realities make Russia’s legal framework unusually consequential:

  1. Broader age reach: conscription now reaches up to 30, while mobilization reaches well into middle age and beyond depending on rank.
  2. More coercive administration: electronic summons and restrictions increase the state’s leverage even without immediate criminal prosecution.
  3. Harsher military criminal exposure: after mobilization, “service crimes” can carry multi-year sentences (including 5–10 for prolonged absence and 5–15 for desertion during mobilization/wartime).

Quick answers to your specific questions

Related recent reporting on how Russia is changing conscription procedures: