Introduction

In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, which began in February 2022 and has now entered its fifth year as of 2026, Russia’s military mobilization efforts have profound implications for human rights and international asylum claims. An expert opinion by Stanislav Stanskikh, a legal scholar and research fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Harvard University’s Davis Center, provides critical insights into Russia’s country conditions, particularly regarding draft evasion and forced military service. This article examines these issues, drawing on Stanskikh’s analysis and recent developments, to highlight risks faced by Russian nationals who oppose participation in the war. For general asylum guidance, see our overview on Asylum in the United States: Eligibility and Process. For detailed analysis of Russia’s mobilization laws, refer to Mobilization-Related Military and Conscription Laws (2022–2025). 

Systemic Human Rights Violations as Context for Mobilization 

Russia’s authoritarian regime, dominated by President Vladimir Putin, features widespread human rights abuses that exacerbate the pressures of mobilization. Credible reports document arbitrary killings, enforced disappearances, torture, harsh prison conditions, and political imprisonment. Since the 2022 invasion, over 20,000 individuals have been detained for anti-war protests, with hundreds facing criminal charges for actions like displaying Ukrainian colors or criticizing the military. 

International bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Council, condemn Russia’s repressive laws on “foreign agents,” “extremism,” and “fake war news,” which suppress dissent. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Russia described a “structural, State-sponsored system of human rights violations” in 2024, with no safe space for opposition. Regional organizations like the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly and the European Court of Human Rights have similarly criticized mass arrests and NGO liquidations. 

These violations create a climate where mobilization is not just a military tool but a means of political repression. For more on how such conditions support asylum claims, refer to our article on country conditions reports in asylum cases. Additional context on restrictive laws can be found in Development of Restrictive Laws on Political Speech and Free Expression in Russia: Historical Overview and 2022-2025 Escalation. 

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as an Act of Aggression 

The international community views Russia’s actions in Ukraine as aggression, involving war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as civilian massacres, torture, and child deportations. Bodies like the International Criminal Court have issued arrest warrants for Russian leaders, including Putin. NATO and the European Parliament have designated Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

This condemnation is central to asylum claims for draft evaders, as refusing service in a condemned conflict can constitute grounds for protection under international standards. For insights into asylum based on refusal to serve, see Asylum For Refusal to Serve in Internationally Condemned Military. 

The Mobilization Process in Russia 

Russia’s military service framework is governed by key laws, including Federal Law No. 59-FZ “On Military Duty and Military Service” (1998, with amendments up to 2025) and Federal Law No. 31-FZ “On Mobilization Preparation and Mobilization” (1997, with amendments up to 2024). The “partial” mobilization, decreed by Putin in September 2022 via Presidential Decree No. 647, targets reservists—men aged 18-55 with military experience—for service in Ukraine. Although officially described as limited, the regime of partial mobilization continues formally without an official end, allowing ongoing recruitment. During partial mobilization, all existing and new military service contracts are automatically prolonged until its conclusion, regardless of original terms. 

The reserve is divided into mobilization human reserve (contracted reserve, known as BARS units, which directly participate in the war) and mobilization human resource. Age gradation for soldiers, sergeants, and NCOs in reserve includes: first-grade up to 40 years, second-grade up to 50, third-grade up to 55. Reservists may be called for trainings up to 12 months total. 

Recruitment persists through coerced contracts, prison enlistment (legalized in June 2023, with around 170,000 prisoners sent by mid-2024), and enlistment of persons under criminal investigation (legalized in October 2024). Those refusing face detention, mistreatment, or threats of execution. The average age of mobilized males is 35 years. 

Recent developments include a shift to year-round conscription starting January 1, 2026, allowing continuous operations by enlistment offices. This enables larger call-ups during mobilization, with summons for assessments possible anytime, though enlistment remains seasonal (spring and fall). Conscripts can be barred from leaving Russia for 30 days upon receiving a summons via the electronic registry. 

In 2025, Russia faced high losses and struggled to build reserves, relying on poorer regions and ethnic minorities without announcing a new full mobilization. Shortages in manpower, tanks, and artillery persist into 2026, constraining advances, with a particular deficit in bottom-level commanders (sergeants, NCOs, junior officers). Authorities use law enforcement as recruitment tools, denying alternative civilian service to many, despite constitutional guarantees. 

For asylum seekers with prior military experience, these practices heighten risks of punitive drafting. Explore related claims in our guide on Conscientious Objectors and Asylum. A success story involving fear of mobilization is detailed in Political Asylum is Granted to the Member of Russian Opposition as Well Fear of Being Mobilized into the Army. 

Consequences of Draft Evasion and Desertion 

Draft evasion under Russia’s Criminal Code (Article 328) carries penalties like fines, labor, or up to two years’ imprisonment. Desertion during mobilization (Article 338) can result in up to 15 years. Amendments in 2023 introduced electronic notices, deemed delivered even if unread, triggering restrictions like driving bans, property transaction prohibitions, and travel restrictions. Ignoring summons after 20 days activates these, though enforcement varies. 

Examples include sentences of seven to nine years for soldiers evading Ukraine deployment. Torture and ill-treatment, such as confinement in pits, punish refusers. Dissidents, including anti-war protesters, face targeted drafts as repression. 

The U.N. Special Rapporteur notes harsher penalties for desertion and “voluntary surrender,” urging asylum for conscientious objectors due to persecution risks. For a broader country focus, consult the COI Report – The Russian Federation: Country Focus. Health eligibility is graded into five categories (A: eligible; B: minor restrictions; V: restrictions; G: temporary ineligible; D: ineligible), determined by the Ministry of Defense. 

International Approaches to Protecting Draft Evaders 

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees recognizes draft evasion as refugee grounds when service involves internationally condemned actions, like Russia’s Ukraine aggression. The E.U. and Court of Justice affirm protection for those refusing crimes against humanity. 

No political opinion is required if the conflict is deemed unlawful. Stanskikh emphasizes that Russian draft evaders form a particular social group eligible for asylum, especially amid punitive practices. 

Kremlin Surveillance of Activists Abroad 

Russia’s transnational repression targets anti-war voices overseas through surveillance, hacking, and Interpol abuse. Freedom House reports assassinations and threats against critics. Consular services may be denied to dissidents, and protest participation documented for use upon return. 

This heightens non-refoulement risks for asylum seekers. For more, see our piece on Transnational Repression and U.S. Asylum Protection. Insights on DHS attempts to block claims, including references to Russian mobilization, are in Understanding DHS Attempts to Block Asylum Claims Using the U.S.-Uganda Agreement. 

Conclusion: Asylum Implications for Russian Draft Evaders 

Russia’s mobilization, amid systemic abuses and an unlawful war, poses severe risks of persecution for evaders. With the partial mobilization regime ongoing since 2022, year-round conscription in 2026, and persistent recruitment pressures—including from prisons and investigations—many face imprisonment, torture, or forced combat. International standards support asylum for those refusing participation. 

If facing similar threats, review our resource on Filing for Asylum from Russia: Key Considerations. Legal consultation is crucial. 

Endnotes

  1. Stanislav Stanskikh, “Expert Opinion Regarding Country Conditions and Factual Allegations in the Asylum Case (Russia),” November 1, 2024. (No public link available; internal expert report.)
  2. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia,” 2023.
  3. United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution on the Deterioration of Human Rights in the Russian Federation, October 7, 2022.
  4. U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Russian Federation, First Report, September 2023; Second Report, September 2024. and Second Report
  5. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution on Political Prisoners in the Russian Federation, 2022; European Court of Human Rights, Judgments on Violations in Russia, Various Dates up to 2024.
  6. NATO Summit Declaration, July 2024.
  7. International Criminal Court, Arrest Warrant for Vladimir Putin, March 2023.
  8. European Parliament Resolution, 2022; NATO Parliamentary Assembly Designation, 2022.
  9. Presidential Decree #647, September 21, 2022.
  10. U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Russian Federation, Reports 2023-2024.
  11. Meduza, “Russia’s conscription system will become year-round starting January 1,” December 30, 2025.
  12. Ibid.
  13. The Moscow Times, “Russia Needs Men to Fight in Ukraine in 2026,” January 5, 2026; Kyiv Post, “Remote Russian Regions Pay the Price,” January 5, 2026.
  14. Institute for the Study of War, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” December 27, 2025; Odessa Journal, “Kostyantyn Mashovets: In 2025, Russian strategic reserve plans,” January 7, 2026.
  15. Russian Constitution and Federal Laws #31-FZ, #53-FZ. (Constitution); Federal Law No. 31-FZ; Federal Law No. 53-FZ
  16. Russian Criminal Code, Article 328.
  17. Russian Criminal Code, Article 338.
  18. Amendments to Conscription Procedures, April 2023.
  19. Mediazona Reports, 2023.
  20. U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Russian Federation, 2024.
  21. Ibid.
  22. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status,” 2019.
  23. E.U. Council Directives; Court of Justice of the European Union, 2020.
  24. Foreign Policy Centre, “No Shelter,” 2016.
  25. Freedom House, “Special Report on Russia,” 2021.
  26. Federal Law No. 59-FZ “On Military Duty and Military Service,” March 28, 1998 (amended up to 2025).; Federal Law No. 31-FZ “On Mobilization Preparation and Mobilization,” February 26, 1997 (amended up to 2024).
  27. A Real Mobilization to Follow Putin’s Bogus Election? CEPA, March 19, 2024.
  28. New Draft and Mobilization Rules in Russia: Increased Coercion, Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 27, 2023.
  29. Russia’s Strange Combination of Conscription and Mobilization, Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 5, 2022.
  30. Russia Toys With Statistics on Contracted Soldiers, Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 28, 2023.
  31. Is Mobilization Really Over in Russia? Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 3, 2022.
  32. Russian Army Recruitment Hangs Between Coercion and Deception, Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 10, 2024.
  33. Russia’s Year of Truth: The Soldier Shortage, CEPA, January 22, 2025.
  34. Russia Faces Significant Future Deficit in Officers Corps, Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 19, 2024.
  35. “Price of Blood” Soars as Russia’s Draftees Evade Service, CEPA, July 17, 2023.