Introduction

Lately, the U.S. government, through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has been trying to speed up the denial of asylum applications by pointing to a deal called the Asylum Cooperative Agreement (ACA) with Uganda, signed on July 29, 2025, and made public on September 3, 2025.[8] These requests, often filed right before a court hearing—like on a Friday evening for a Monday session—claim that the agreement means asylum seekers must go to Uganda instead, and judges can reject U.S. claims without hearing evidence, stories from applicants, or checking if Uganda is truly safe. This is part of a bigger push to send people to other countries quickly, with similar deals in places like Guatemala and Honduras.[15][2] But the law isn’t that simple—it requires careful checks to make sure people aren’t sent into danger. This article breaks down what DHS is saying, what the rules really require, important court decisions, and facts about conditions in Uganda that show why each person’s safety needs a close look. We’ve included the latest info as of December 15, 2025, to help you understand your options if you’re facing this. Remember, this is general info—talk to an immigration lawyer for your situation. Visit myattorneyusa.com for more resources. 

The Last-Minute “Block” Tactic: A Quick Way to Deny Claims?

DHS files requests to block (or “pretermit”) asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) just because there’s an Asylum Cooperative Agreement (ACA) with Uganda. DHS says INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), acts like an automatic stop sign, making asylum seekers ineligible for U.S. protection right away, without needing more facts, stories, or personal safety checks.[6] But that’s not right. The law, rules, and court rulings don’t allow blocking claims this way. INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), is a limited rule that only kicks in if someone can really be sent to another country where they’re safe from harm and can get a fair shot at protection. DHS hasn’t picked Uganda as the removal spot, hasn’t proven Uganda would take asylum seekers, and hasn’t shown—with facts or law—that Uganda is safe for them.[6][8] What DHS wants isn’t following the rule—it’s a fast track to decide big things like safety without proof. The immigration law (INA), related rules, and key decisions from the Second Circuit Court say no to that.[4][5][6][7][14][15][16] These last-minute moves—filed on Friday, December 12, 2025, just before a Monday, December 15, 2025, hearing—are part of DHS’s new pattern to skip full reviews without records on country safety or personal risks.[1][2] In real life, this turns a deep check into a quick no, putting lawyers in a tough spot: without a delay, they have to argue about Uganda’s safety overnight while prepping the main case.[2][52] This could break fairness rules by not giving a real chance to fight back, as promised in INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).[4] DHS’s requests overlook asylum seekers’ real dangers, like proven political protest in Russia and the U.S., plus being eligible for military draft and reporting corruption, which raise chances of being sent back to harm in a place like Uganda with growing ties to Russia.[27][28][87] Reports show Uganda’s problems with random arrests, torture, and limits on free speech make it hard to assume it’s safe for everyone.[17][18][21][22] 

What the Law Really Says: A Limited Rule Based on Facts

The “safe third country” rule is from law, not up to judges’ choice. Congress created a narrow block on U.S. asylum only if someone can be sent to another country under an agreement that gives a “full and fair” protection process and no danger of harm.[6] Rules from 2019 explain how these deals work, but they can’t ignore the basics. Just having the deal doesn’t settle if Uganda is safe or open for specific people now.[7][8] This rule, part of the 1996 immigration reform law (IIRIRA), aimed to stop “shopping” for better asylum spots while sharing refugee loads fairly—but only if rights are protected, not for quick denials without checks.[12][19][20][21][80] “May Be Removed” Needs a Real Path: The rule only applies if someone “may be removed” under the agreement. INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A). Congress didn’t mean “maybe possible” or “covered by the deal.” It needs real legal and practical options. This fits with INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), which sets removal countries. The law expects steps: (1) pick the removal country; (2) confirm it’s possible; (3) check safety and fairness.[6][7] DHS hasn’t chosen Uganda for removal, hasn’t started the process, and hasn’t shown Uganda accepts people. Without that, no one “may be removed” to Uganda legally. So the rule doesn’t start.[6] Courts say “may be removed” means more than ideas—it needs proof it’s doable, including the other country agreeing and no send-back to danger.[11][12][13] In fights over similar deals with Central America, courts stopped them when safety wasn’t proven, showing the rule needs solid paths.[9][10][30] DHS skips this by saying the deal is enough, but the 1996 law’s history says limits must follow the rule, not grow through shortcuts. H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 174 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).[12][80] For those at risk from Russia’s long arm, this step isn’t met, as Uganda’s quick deport powers and money shortages could mean send-back without protection.[20][42][50][51] “Full and Fair Procedure” Is About Real Access: INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), also needs the other country to give “full and fair” protection checks. This includes fairness ideas. It looks at how it works in real life, especially for political cases, not just the deal or laws on paper.[6][7][29][30][31] UN guidelines say safe countries must “actually take charge” and stop send-back to harm.[29][30][31] New reports show Uganda halting refugee status for some groups due to funding issues, meaning “full and fair” needs fresh proof.[20][42] For Russian opponents, Uganda’s arrests, torture, and speech limits hurt fair chances.[17][21][38][50] 

The Rules in Action: 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(h) Keeps Personal Reviews

The rule for these deals shows it’s not automatic. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(h), judges must check: 1. If the ACA fits the person. 2. If exceptions apply; and 3. If the person shows it’s more likely they’ll face harm or torture in the ACA country. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(h)(2)–(3).[5][7] Key part: § 1240.11(h)(2)(iii) keeps objections based on CAT and harm. A rule letting people prove danger in the ACA country doesn’t match DHS’s no-proof-needed claim.[5][7] This setup matches Congress’s goal for personal checks, as in the 1996 law’s history against wide blocks. H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 174 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).[12][80] Some say these rules go beyond the law by not forcing strong safety promises, like past court wins against similar deals for breaking immigration law.[9][10][11] In dissident cases, personal reviews are key given draft risks and profiles, where Uganda’s low-funded refugee setup (42% funded in 2024, cutting services) raises send-back dangers.[20][42][50][51] 

Key Court Rulings: No Shortcuts Instead of Full Reviews

Board of Immigration Appeals: In Matter of C-I-G-M- & L-V-S-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 291, 295–96 (BIA 2025), the Board said ACA issues can come early, but judges must look at proof and arguments on fit, exceptions, and risk. It doesn’t allow total blocks when people raise personal harm or torture claims.[7] Cases differ from Matter of CIGM & LSVG when DHS wants regional shifts without (i) Russian harm fears, (ii) high cross-border repression risk, (iii) Russia–Uganda military link proof, and (iv) draft call-up exposure if sent on. Those differences back the Board’s main idea: ACA checks are fact-based, need full records, and aren’t for blocking when people raise personal harm or torture.[7][23][24][39][40][41][46][47][48] Second Circuit Rulings: The Second Circuit says CAT stops removal if torture is likely, including indirect “chain” send-back via another country, and formal promises or general safe assumptions can’t replace personal, future-focused checks. Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170–72 (2d Cir. 2004); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2004); Manning v. Barr, 954 F.3d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 2020).[14][15][16] The Court also says removal choices with future harm need personal, forward checks, not broad assumptions: Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170–72 (2d Cir. 2004), says CAT blocks removal if torture is likely, including chain send-back, and deals can’t beat CAT if protections fail in practice. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2004), needs country facts applied to the person, rejecting general safe ideas. Manning v. Barr, 954 F.3d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 2020), needs all risk sources together. Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008), stresses CAT looks at likely post-removal events, not paper protections. Islami v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 2005), sees punishment for refusing bad military service as harm.[14][15][16] These stop DHS from settling safety and send-back without facts, especially with Uganda’s killings, torture, detentions matching dissident risks.[17][21][38][49][50][51][55][56][57][58] Congress Limited Third-Country Blocks to Formal “Safe Third Country” Deals; DHS Can’t Make New Blocks Via Shortcuts or Safe Assumptions: Congress chose to limit third-country asylum stops to specific cases. INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), applies only if someone “may be removed” under a deal ensuring (1) “full and fair” claim check and (2) real safety from harm or torture. History shows Congress didn’t give the government free rein to add blocks: the 1996 report said extra limits must fit the rule. H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 174 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 950 F.3d 1242, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (using that history).[12][9] Courts have rejected rule or practice attempts to do what Congress limited. In East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 950 F.3d 1242, 1271 (9th Cir. 2020), the Ninth Circuit said qualified people can only be denied if there’s a “safe option” elsewhere, and Congress didn’t let agencies add extra blocks beyond listed ones in § 208(a).[9] DHS’s motion does just that end-run East Bay nixed: treat Uganda ACA as auto-block—without proving “may be removed,” showing Uganda as removal spot, or personal proof-based safety under § 208(a)(2)(A) and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(h).[9][5][6][7] In Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 2020), the Ninth Circuit saw a challenge to “unlawful, wide pattern denying asylum access,” and okayed stops to keep legal asylum path while checking government acts.[13] It shows federal view: government shortcuts and informal ways can’t kill asylum right without meeting Congress rules.[13] In Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2020), the D.C. Circuit hit policies raising fear-of-harm bars above Congress’s plan, saying they can’t stand under law or rules.[10] Same here: DHS can’t turn § 208(a)(2)(A)’s narrow block into wide quick-denial tool based on safe guesses, half-records, and unproven deals.[10][6] So, even if DHS tests Uganda deal limits, law needs proof and personal checks—not motions skipping review and denying “full and fair” Congress required for third-country moves.[6][7][12][80] 

Individualized Political and Security Profiles in Asylum Cases: Highlighting Common Risks for Russian Dissidents

In cases involving Russian political dissidents, individualized profiles often include documented opposition activity that is identifiable and ongoing. Such dissidents may have participated in public protests criticizing President Vladimir Putin and the constitutional amendments designed to entrench his rule. Their political activity was not limited to private expression; it occurred in public spaces and drew the attention of local authorities. Following their activism, Russian police targeted them and their family through intimidation, physical violence, and abuse of state institutions. In particular, Russian authorities retaliated against them after a corruption complaint against a state-linked entity. Police officers conducted raids, detained family members, and engaged in coercive questioning. They were subjected to threats and physical mistreatment, and authorities leveraged child-protective mechanisms as a tool of political pressure—an increasingly documented tactic used by Russian authorities against dissidents and their families. These actions were not isolated criminal acts; they reflected state retaliation tied directly to political expression and perceived disloyalty.[23][24][25][26][29][32][33][34][35][36][37] Their political profile did not end when they left Russia. After arriving in the United States, they continued anti-Kremlin activism, including participation in protests, public demonstrations opposing Russia’s war in Ukraine, and activities aligned with the broader Russian pro-democracy movement in exile. Such diaspora activism is expressly targeted by Russian authorities, who have labeled overseas critics “foreign agents,” “extremists,” or traitors. Russian security services actively monitor political activity abroad, particularly in countries with diplomatic or security relationships with Russia. As a result, their risk profile is ongoing and escalating, not historical.[23][24][25][26][29][30][31][32][33][36] Asylum seekers face independent and compounding risk, separate from and in addition to family persecution. They filed a corruption complaint implicating state-connected interests, placing them on the radar of law enforcement and security bodies. As the spouse of a known dissident, they are also subject to collective punishment dynamics that are well documented in contemporary Russia, where family members of political opponents are targeted to deter dissent. Most critically, they are draft-eligible Russian men with an active mobilization summons issued in connection with Russia’s war in Ukraine. This fact fundamentally alters the risk calculus. Russian mobilization is not discretionary or symbolic; refusal to comply results in criminal prosecution, detention, and imprisonment, while compliance entails forced participation in a military campaign marked by widespread reports of abuse, coercion, and high casualty rates. For them, return to Russian control presents a binary outcome: forced conscription into an internationally condemned war or imprisonment for refusal. Either outcome constitutes severe persecution.[23][24][39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48] The mobilization summons also places them in a category of heightened enforcement priority. Russian authorities aggressively pursue draft evaders, including those who left the country, and have increasingly treated asylum-seekers and emigrants as traitors. Their political history, family association, and draft status together create a high-visibility risk profile that cannot be neutralized by relocation to a third country lacking stable legal protection.[23][24][39][40][41][46][47][48] Recent data shows convictions for draft evasion rising to 580 in the first half of 2025, with tightened border controls and electronic registers to combat avoidance.[45][46][48] 

Uganda’s Human Rights Environment Contradicts Any Presumption of Safety

Reports show why Uganda can’t be assumed safe. The U.S. State Department says in Uganda “arbitrary arrest or detention remained a significant human rights issue,” with “reports of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by security forces,” and “serious restrictions on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.” U.S. Dep’t of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda (2025).[17][27] Security forces hit journalists with violence, harassment, and intimidation, with real stories of random killings, disappearances, and torture.[17][22][60] For instance, security forces randomly arrested opposition supporters, activists, demonstrators, journalists, and LGBTQ+ people, often without warrants, holding them too long.[60] Cases include army officers holding opposition in military spots without court, and opposition kept cut off.[60] The latest U.S. State Department travel warning says “Violent crime is a real danger in Uganda” and “Police struggle to respond to serious crime in most places due to limited resources.” U.S. Dep’t of State, Uganda Travel Advisory—Level 3: Reconsider Travel (Dec. 8, 2025).[18] While for U.S. travelers, this shows the law needs real safety, not just ideas.[18] Human Rights Watch reports a “continued crackdown on political opposition, critics, and rights activists,” including detention under vague public-order laws. As they note, “The authorities clamped down on free expression online, arresting and charging individuals for criticizing government officials online.” Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025 – Uganda.[38][20] Amnesty International says authorities “used restrictive laws and policies to silence dissent” and harassed groups. “Online attacks against Uganda’s LGBTQ communities have drastically increased, owing to overly broad laws that criminalize various aspects of the lives of LGBTQ people and entrench discrimination.” Amnesty Int’l, Uganda 2024.[21][28] These ideas guide not just CAT claims, but if asylum can be blocked without facts on safety and send-back risks. These problems make it hard to say Uganda is safe for all, especially Russian dissidents at risk from cross-border pressure with Uganda’s Russia ties.[17][21][38][49][50][51][55][56][57][58][60][61] 

LGBTQ Risks in Uganda: Why It’s Not Safe for Everyone

Even if someone’s main fear is from somewhere else, LGBTQ issues can matter—as a separate danger if family is LGBTQ or seen that way, or as proof the host country punishes identity and ties, even protected ones in the U.S. Uganda’s laws and real-life treatment of LGBTQ people make blanket “safe” claims hard. Amnesty International says “criminalization and state-aligned hostility have fueled threats and discriminatory enforcement, including online and offline targeting of LGBTQ people.”[21] Reuters reported in 2024 that Uganda’s Constitutional Court “upheld the core of the Anti-Homosexuality Act, leaving severe penalties in place while striking some provisions.”[22] Human Rights Watch’s 2025 report adds “authorities have arrested and charged individuals for criticizing officials online… Protests against corruption have been met with mass arrests.”[38] For asylum seekers, Reuters in 2024 said “Uganda’s sexual minorities face escalating human rights violations, with over 1000 cases… involving arrests, torture and house evictions.”[56] The New Humanitarian quoted in 2023 (ongoing issue): “The anti-homosexuality law has provided grounds for authorities to kick out refugees who do not conform to gender stereotypes.”[55] This setup is tough to match with any general claim Uganda is safe for all—especially when DHS wants blocks before checking personal risks.[17][21][38][49][50][51][55][56][57][58][60][61] 

Uganda’s 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA) sets harsh penalties for same-sex acts and related things, and the Constitutional Court kept the main parts on April 3, 2024.[4] Since it started, reports show more arrests, violence, extortion, evictions, and no punishment for attacks on LGBTQ people and families.[14] The U.S. State Department’s Uganda Travel Advisory (December 8, 2025) warns Uganda’s laws target based on sexual orientation, and the AHA criminalizes consensual same-sex relations for visitors and residents alike.[15] The 2024 Human Rights Report notes big abuses, like random holds and harm, including for LGBTQ folks.[16] 

For openly same-sex married couples with kids, risk isn’t guesswork. Family setup itself shows LGBTQ identity and “promotion,” leading to authority contacts (housing, school, health, IDs, daily life) that expose to criminal probes, holds, and violence. The AHA’s wide reach and abuse pattern mean high harm chance.[6] Plus, severe harm risk in state hold—and no real protection—backs CAT claims. To check torture odds, look at country facts, state protect willingness, and likely LGBTQ treatment in jail.[17] Here, records and reports show big, personal harm risk if sent to Uganda. 

Uganda’s hit on LGBTQ advocacy and “promotion” limits block lawyer access, safe reports, and real protection. Courts upheld refusing to register a top LGBTQ group, building barriers for help.[18] Reports describe a setup where family, landlords, and helpers fear charges or payback for aiding LGBTQ people.[14] Sending to Uganda for protection checks doesn’t fit the law’s “full and fair procedure” need and risks send-back—direct or via holds, charges, or weak protections.[19] 

To see how this plays out, consider real examples. Human Rights Watch reported in May 2025: “Ugandan authorities have perpetrated widespread discrimination and violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people…” including arrests and evictions under the AHA. A June 2024 report by Convening for Equality found over 1,000 violations since the AHA, like arrests and torture. In July 2025, 76Crimes noted “hundreds of LGBTIQ+ Ugandans have faced arrest, violence, and evictions” in two years. These cases show the AHA’s real impact, with increased attacks and little accountability. 

Uganda doesn’t have a full Russian military base, but reports show strong teamwork: Russian help with military fixes and air setups in Ugandan bases, buying weapons, training officers, and top meetings. The Africa Report, What’s Behind Russia’s Military Bromance with Uganda? (Nov. 2025).[31] New reports and Uganda official words show the teamwork includes real defense builds and skill help in Uganda’s military spots. For example, defense news noted a Pro Heli helicopter fix plant in Nakasongola Military area, and Uganda’s leader said he started a Military Fix Facility at Gaddafi Barracks with Russian help. Jeremy Binnie, Uganda Opens Helicopter MRO Facility, Janes (Jan. 24, 2022); Nat’l Enter. Corp. (NEC), Proheli Ltd (UPDF/NEC partnership); Museveni Receives $53m Military Equipment from Russia, (Oct. 26, 2025).[13][14][15] These facts count in cases: the stronger the Uganda-Russia security link, the harder to believe—without proof—Uganda is a safe, independent spot for Russian opponents.[27][28][87] Uganda lines up with Russia in world affairs, not voting on UN calls against Ukraine invasion, and its leader openly backs ties with Moscow. VOA Africa, Uganda Deepens Russia Ties (Mar. 2024).[12] This link matters legally because the U.S. State Department notes Russia’s cross-border pressure, including pushing other countries to hold or send critics. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia.[23][29][30] In a place with wide deport power and little court check, being close to the harming country raises risk for dissidents.[17][21][38][49][50][51][55][56][57][58][60] 

Chain Refoulement and CAT: Foreseeable Risks Barring Pretermission

Even if a court thinks asylum could be limited by the ACA, CAT protection can’t be blocked if torture or send-back risk is likely. Uganda law lets quick deport for security or public reasons with little court watch and wide leader power. Asylum seekers without lasting status can be held or sent via processes without strong safeguards. UNHCR and rights groups note Uganda’s overloaded system leaves many in long legal waits, raising hold and send risks.[4][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][62] New reports from the European Union Agency for Asylum confirm Russian dissidents face ongoing crackdowns, including charges, watching, and punishment for abroad acts. The EUAA says people back in Russia after time away get questioned at borders, phones checked, and cases started from online or ties. It notes Russia’s draft system force, raids, and penalties for no-show, meaning return for draft-age means big detention and bad treatment risk. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Country of Origin Information Report: Russia – Country Focus (Dec. 2025).[24][39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48] For draft-eligible Russians with calls, any status break in Uganda leads to likely hold and send-on. Uganda gives no lasting ACA protection, and DHS shows no way to stop deport after send. The risk isn’t guesswork. Russian leaders show cross-border pressure pattern, pushing countries to hold, send, or stop opponents. Places with strong Russia military and talk ties—with leader-run immigration—are extra open to pressure. Uganda’s noted military teamwork, weapon need, officer training, and world lineup with Russia raise chances Russian asks or push get done, not fought.[10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][23][25][26][29][30][31][32][33][36] If sent or back to Russia, results are fast and bad. They’d face forced draft to Ukraine war or jail for no, both with big torture or bad treatment risk. Russian jails are known for abuse, and drafted troops face force, beatings, and send without training or gear. These harms aren’t iffy; they come straight from current legal and political spot.[23][24][29][32][33][34][35][36][37][39][40][41][46][47][48] Under key Second Circuit rulings, CAT stops send if torture likely as seen result, including indirect “chain” send via another country. Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170–72 (2d Cir. 2004). The court needs personal, future check, not broad safe guesses or paper deals. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2004); Manning v. Barr, 954 F.3d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 2020).[14][15][16] As asylum seekers face real likely torture or harm via send-on, CAT alone stops block, no matter asylum points. DHS try to settle without facts is legally wrong. Plus, DHS should say if it’ll use rule under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(h)(3) to let asylum seekers seek U.S. protection if public good, despite ACA.[5][7] As Human Rights Watch reports, “Transnational repression may mean that a person’s family members who remain at home become targets of collective punishment, such as the Tajik activist whose family in Tajikistan, including his 10-year-old daughter, was detained, interrogated, and threatened.” And “Back home, families and friends of targeted people may also become victims, as governments detain, harass, or harm them as retribution or collective punishment.”[46] 

DHS’s Eleventh-Hour Motion Practice Violates EOIR Filing Expectations, Denies Asylum Seekers a Meaningful Opportunity to Be Heard, and Warrants Denial or Continuance

DHS often files these motions to pretermit right before hearings—sometimes just before a weekend when a session is set for the next business day. This kind of last-minute filing weakens the fair back-and-forth process set by immigration law (INA) and EOIR’s guidelines. Asylum seekers shouldn’t have to argue big legal blocks, country safety facts, and risks of being sent back to harm with basically no time to prepare.[1][2][3][4][13] So, courts should (1) deny the motion because it’s unfair and breaks rules; or at least (2) hold off and make DHS refile properly so asylum seekers can reply with a full record; or (3) delay the hearing for complete arguments and proof on if Uganda is safe, legal, and won’t send people back to danger. Immigration judges have the power—and duty—to run cases fairly. They can reject or pause big decisions from late filings, set deadlines, and allow delays for good reasons. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1003.31(h), 1240.6; Matter of InterianoRosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 264, 265–66 (BIA 2010).[5] Judges should use this power to stop harm from DHS’s bad timing. Finally, DHS gives no proof Uganda agrees to take these asylum seekers. The deal says Uganda can say yes or no to transfers. Without acceptance proof, DHS can’t push to block asylum on a maybe-place.[8] DHS also blames asylum seekers for not mentioning Uganda fear earlier—but DHS files late, before real notice or a record on Uganda safety. That’s a loop: DHS makes the need for early Uganda talk by hiding its plan, then uses the gap to block. The motion shows why quick rulings are unfair. DHS filings often have fact and record mistakes from rushing. For example, DHS might say asylum seekers didn’t enter legally, but records show valid visa entry. DHS might send the Form I589 without key statements, twisting the case. This counts because the Board says, once DHS notes ACA transfer, “the respondent must have a reasonable opportunity to satisfy his or her burden” to show the block doesn’t apply. Matter of CIGM & LSVG, 29 I&N Dec. 291, 295 (BIA 2025).[7] And the INA promises in removal cases “shall have a reasonable opportunity” to check evidence and share their side. INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).[4] The timing is extra wrong here. The U.S.–Uganda deal DHS uses came out earlier in 2025, and the Board’s new ACA ruling was in late October 2025. DHS had plenty of time to bring this up fairly for a real reply; instead, it waited till just before trial.[8][7] 

DHS’s Test-Case Strategy and Due Process: Systemic Efforts to Normalize Shortcuts

DHS has begun filing motions to pretermit asylum before designation, without individualized analysis, and without attempting third-country removal. This reflects a systemic effort to normalize pretermission before factual development. The statute does not permit asylum adjudication by momentum. Granting this Motion would deny asylum seekers a meaningful opportunity to present evidence, violating due process.[4][13] Federal courts have repeatedly rejected efforts to impose new asylumeligibility restrictions through informal arrangements or generalized assumptions of safety rather than through the specific statutory and regulatory framework Congress authorized. See, e.g., East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 950 F.3d 1242, 1270–71 (9th Cir. 2020); Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 893–96 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2020).[9][10][13] Those principles reinforce the need for a developed record and careful adjudication—not pretermission on an eleventhhour motion. This posture matters because the safethirdcountry bar was enacted as a narrow, conditional exception to the general right to apply for asylum. Congress limited the bar to circumstances where the applicant “may be removed” pursuant to a qualifying bilateral agreement that actually ensures access to a full and fair asylum procedure and protection against refoulement. The Court should be cautious about allowing DHS to transform that narrow statutory pathway into a generalized, prehearing shortcut that pretermits adjudication without individualized evidence.[6][7][12][80] 

Key Takeaway

The ACA does not eliminate individualized adjudication. Safety is a record-based finding, not a presumption. Pretermitting without evidence—especially last-minute—violates the INA, EOIR rules, and fair hearing requirements.[4][6][15] 

Disclaimer: This article is for educational purposes and is not legal advice. 

Endnotes

  1. Immigration Court Practice Manual ch. 3.1(b)(2) (Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“Responses to filings must be filed within ten (10) days after the original filing with the immigration court.”).
  2. Immigration Court Practice Manual ch. 5.10(a) (Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (motions to continue; written motions preferred; “good cause” standard).
  3. EOIR Policy Manual, App. C (Deadlines) (Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (listing default “Responses” deadline as “10 days after the filing is received by the Immigration Court”).
  4. INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (reasonable opportunity to examine evidence, present evidence, and cross-examine).
  5. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (continuances for “good cause shown”).
  6. INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (safe third country bar applies only when an applicant “may be removed” pursuant to an agreement and only if the third country provides access to a full and fair procedure and protection from persecution).
  7. Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum Cooperative Agreements Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,994 (Nov. 19, 2019) (final rule).
  8. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Uganda for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Requests, 90 Fed. Reg. 42,597 (Sept. 3, 2025) (publishing text of the agreement).
  9. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2020).
  10. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
  11. Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2020).
  12. H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 174 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
  13. Jeremy Binnie, Uganda Opens Helicopter MRO Facility, Janes (Jan. 24, 2022).
  14. Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170–72 (2d Cir. 2004).
  15. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2004).
  16. Manning v. Barr, 954 F.3d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 2020).
  17. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda (published Aug. 12, 2025).
  18. U.S. Dep’t of State, Uganda International Travel Information (Travel Advisory) (accessed Dec. 2025).
  19. Uganda Refugees Act, 2006, Act No. 21 of 2006 (Uganda).
  20. The Guardian, Uganda Stops Granting Refugee Status for Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians (Dec. 4, 2025).
  21. Amnesty Int’l, Uganda: Criminalization Shrinks Online Civic Space for LGBTQ People (Oct. 23, 2024).
  22. Reuters, Ugandan Court Upholds Anti-Homosexuality Law but Strikes Some Provisions (Apr. 3, 2024).
  23. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia (July 2025).
  24. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), COI Report – The Russian Federation: Country Focus, Dec. 2025.
  25. Human Rights Watch, “We Will Find You”: A Global Look at How Governments Repress Nationals Abroad (Feb. 22, 2024).
  26. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Security Division, Transnational Repression (updated Feb. 13, 2025).
  27. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Uganda” (U.S. government-hosted report) (June 16, 2024).
  28. Congressional Research Service, Uganda: Current Issues and U.S. Relations (Apr. 20, 2025).
  29. UNHCR, Guidance Note on Bilateral and/or Multilateral Transfer Arrangements of Asylum-Seekers (May 2013).
  30. UNHCR, Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement (Nov. 1997) (safe third country requires a state that “will actually accept responsibility”).
  31. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights (OHCHR), The Principle of Non-Refoulement Under International Human Rights Law (2018).
  32. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia (2025)
  33. U.S. Dep’t of State, Transnational Repression by the Russian Federation (2024)
  34. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Country of Origin Information Report: Russia – Country Focus (Dec. 2025)
  35. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Uganda: Operational Update and Protection Environment (2024–2025)
  36. The Africa Report, What’s Behind Russia’s Military Bromance with Uganda? (Nov. 2025)
  37. VOA Africa, Uganda Deepens Russia Ties (Mar. 2024)
  38. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Uganda (2025)
  39. Amnesty Int’l, Uganda 2024
  40. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Uganda Fact Sheet (2024)
  41. Matter of CIGM & LVSG, 29 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 2025).
  42. The Guardian, Uganda Stops Granting Refugee Status for Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians (Dec. 4, 2025).
  43. Reuters, Funding for Refugees in Uganda (Aug. 4, 2025).
  44. UN News, Uganda’s Refugee Funding Crisis (Aug. 4, 2025).
  45. EUAA, COI Report – The Russian Federation: Country Focus, Dec. 2025.
  46. Human Rights Watch, “We Will Find You”: A Global Look at How Governments Repress Nationals Abroad (Feb. 22, 2024).
  47. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Security Division, Transnational Repression (updated Feb. 13, 2025).
  48. Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Uganda (Inst. of New Europe, June 16, 2024).
  49. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Uganda (2025)
  50. Amnesty Int’l, Uganda 2024
  51. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda (2025)
  52. Congressional Research Service, Uganda: Current Issues and U.S. Relations (Apr. 20, 2025)
  53. The New Humanitarian, Uganda’s Anti-Gay Law (Oct. 9, 2023)
  54. Reuters, Rights Violations in Uganda (June 3, 2024)
  55. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Uganda
  56. The Guardian, Uganda’s Human Rights Crisis (Dec. 10, 2025)
  57. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda
  58. Amnesty Int’l, Uganda: Criminalization Shrinks Online Civic Space for LGBTQ People (Oct. 23, 2024)
  59. UNHCR, Nearly 2 Million Refugees at Risk (Aug. 4, 2025)
  60. H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 174 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)
  61. Museveni Receives $53m Military Equipment from Russia, Museveni.org (Oct. 26, 2025)