Introduction

White House Border Czar Tom Homan publicly acknowledged on May 20, 2026 that the pace of deportations under President Donald Trump’s second term has declined, attributing the slowdown to a combination of adverse federal court rulings, sanctuary city policies, a 75-day Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding lapse, and continuing political fallout from immigration enforcement operations in Minneapolis. In a lengthy interview with Anna Giaritelli of the Washington Examiner conducted at the White House complex, Homan stated that “[n]umbers are slightly down, but there’s a plan. Get them back up and even higher,” and reported a 12 percent decline in arrests, which he attributed to “activist judges.” Anna Giaritelli, Tom Homan Insists ICE Is Not Narrowing Deportation Agenda, Wash. Examiner (May 20, 2026).

The Numbers According to Homan

Homan reported that, over the first 16 months of the Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and its federal partners have arrested approximately 641,000 noncitizens and removed more than 800,000 from the United States. He represented that approximately 60 percent of those removed had criminal records, although he did not provide any breakdown by offense category, conviction status, or whether the underlying offenses were violent. Homan stated that arrests under the second Trump term have already exceeded both the 500,000 ICE arrests recorded across the four years of the Biden Administration and the 548,000 ICE arrests recorded during the first Trump term. Id.

The 800,000 figure is, however, methodologically distinct from the figures used in past DHS reporting. According to Axios, the Administration intends to count, within its “deportation” totals, both ICE interior removals and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) returns of recent border crossers, which is the same composite methodology used during the Obama Administration and which Republicans previously criticized as inflating the underlying numbers. Brittany Gibson, Trump Copies Obama’s Playbook on Counting Deportations, Axios (May 21, 2026). Notably, Axios reports that “ICE data released in April showed the agency deported 442,000 people in fiscal year 2025,” a figure well below the headline 800,000 number when ICE removals are isolated from CBP returns. Id.

These figures are not, at present, independently verifiable from regularly published DHS data. Axios reports that the Office of Homeland Security Statistics has not been regularly updated since late 2024. Id. Homan acknowledged the transparency gap during the Examiner interview and stated that Secretary Markwayne Mullin is “committed to putting stats [out] on a more regular basis, which wasn’t being done prior.” Giaritelli, supra. Until that occurs, practitioners and the public must rely on the Administration’s own characterizations of its enforcement activity, which warrants appropriate caution.

The Factors Homan Cites for the Slowdown

Federal Court Rulings

Homan placed substantial blame on the federal judiciary, asserting that he has “never seen so many activist judges” and that judicial intervention is responsible for the reported 12 percent decline in arrests. Id. The Trump Administration has been the subject of numerous temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and stays in immigration-related litigation over the past year, several of which have reached the appellate courts and the Supreme Court. Three lines of cases are of particular consequence:

  • Third-country removals. The Supreme Court has, on two separate occasions, vacated lower-court orders that had constrained the Administration’s policy of removing noncitizens to third countries (countries other than their countries of nationality or last habitual residence). On June 23, 2025, the Court granted an emergency stay of the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Brian E. Murphy of the District of Massachusetts, which had required notice and a “meaningful opportunity” for affected noncitizens to raise Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims before being removed to third countries. On July 3, 2025, the Court further clarified that its June 23 stay rendered Judge Murphy’s May 21, 2025 remedial order unenforceable as well. The merits, including the procedural protections owed to affected noncitizens, remain in active litigation.
  • Mandatory detention. Federal courts of appeals have divided on the Administration’s policy of detaining noncitizens throughout the pendency of their removal proceedings rather than considering release on bond or recognizance, and the question is now poised for Supreme Court review. See Giaritelli, supra (noting that the issue “will likely send the issue to the Supreme Court to decide”). The outcome will materially affect counsel’s ability to obtain bond redeterminations under INA § 236(a) and to invoke the framework set forth in Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2001), in collateral habeas litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
  • Enforcement tactics at courthouses and in the field. On December 24, 2025, Judge P. Casey Pitts of the Northern District of California issued a stay in Sequen v. Albarran enjoining ICE and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) from conducting civil arrests at immigration courthouses within ICE’s San Francisco Area of Responsibility, on the ground that the Administration’s revised courthouse-arrest policies were likely arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Other district courts have considered limits on roving patrols, warrantless field arrests, and the use of facial coverings and unmarked agents during enforcement actions; the durability and scope of these rulings remain contested on appeal.

Counsel should note that the Administration’s public framing of these rulings as the product of judicial activism obscures the substantive statutory and constitutional questions presented, many of which involve longstanding doctrines of procedural due process, the proper scope of executive authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the limits of nationwide injunctive relief addressed in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. _ (2025). The fact that these issues remain unsettled means operational policy can shift materially within a matter of days, with corresponding consequences for clients in active proceedings.

Sanctuary Jurisdictions

Homan reiterated his longstanding position that sanctuary city policies, which restrict cooperation between local law enforcement and ICE on civil immigration detainers, force ICE to conduct arrests in residential neighborhoods and at places of employment rather than within secure jail facilities. He described a recent meeting with New York Governor Kathy Hochul, in which Governor Hochul moved to terminate intergovernmental service agreements (IGSAs) and 287(g) arrangements that had permitted ICE to hold noncitizens temporarily in county jails. Giaritelli, supra.

Homan stated that the termination of these agreements will, in his view, increase ICE’s operational footprint in New York and lead to a greater number of collateral arrests of family members residing with the targeted noncitizen. From a noncitizen’s perspective, the practical implication is that arrests in New York are increasingly likely to occur in or near homes, at places of employment, and during vehicle stops, and that detainees may be transferred out of state shortly after apprehension, complicating timely access to counsel and to family. Id.

Homan also disclosed that he met recently with Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche and that the Department of Justice intends to file additional civil enforcement actions against sanctuary jurisdictions in the near future. Id.

The 75-Day DHS Funding Lapse

The 75-day DHS funding lapse, the longest in the Department’s history, did not directly suspend ICE or Border Patrol operational personnel, who continued to work while accruing back pay. It did, however, cut off funding to contractors providing back-office support for enforcement operations, including detention logistics, transportation, and case processing. Id. The downstream operational consequences continue to be felt in detention scheduling and removal flight availability.

The Minneapolis Fallout

Homan attributed much of the political friction that led to the shutdown to two DHS-involved fatal shootings in Minneapolis in January 2026 (described in the Examiner interview as “shootings of two activists,” though both decedents were United States citizens) and the subsequent congressional scrutiny of enforcement tactics. Id. He stated that lawmakers from both parties raised concerns during appropriations negotiations about agent identification, body-worn cameras, the use of masks during operations, warrantless arrests, and so-called roving patrols. Id. The Minneapolis operation, known publicly as Operation Metro Surge, also contributed to the replacement of former Secretary Kristi Noem with former Senator Markwayne Mullin, who has signaled an intent to stabilize Department operations and improve public reporting.

What Comes Next

Homan signaled that the Administration is preparing a renewed enforcement push, particularly in New York and other sanctuary jurisdictions, but declined to provide operational details, citing officer safety. He reiterated that the prioritization of public safety and national security threats does not preclude the arrest of other removable noncitizens, observing that “just because you prioritize public safety threats doesn’t mean you arrest somebody else.” Id.

Press reporting indicates that an external pro-enforcement organization styled the “Mass Deportation Coalition” has urged the Administration to commit publicly to a target of one million removals, and that Secretary Mullin is reportedly evaluating that figure. See Nick Naulty, Tom Homan Admits Deportations Are ‘Slightly Down’, Daily Caller (May 20, 2026). Whether the Administration adopts that benchmark, and how it reconciles such a target with the continuing judicial constraints on its preferred enforcement tools, will be among the principal questions in immigration enforcement over the coming months.

Implications for Noncitizens and Practitioners

Several practical points warrant emphasis.

First, the Administration’s own acknowledgment that judicial review is materially constraining enforcement underscores the continuing importance of habeas corpus, mandamus, and Administrative Procedure Act litigation in individual cases. Noncitizens detained pursuant to policies currently under appellate review, including third-country removal designations and prolonged mandatory detention, should consult counsel promptly regarding available collateral relief.

Second, the breakdown of 287(g) and IGSA arrangements in jurisdictions such as New York will accelerate the practice of transferring detainees out of state. Counsel should anticipate venue and access-to-counsel disputes and, where appropriate, file early motions for change of venue, bond redetermination, or termination of proceedings prior to transfer.

Third, the Administration’s contemplated escalation of civil enforcement litigation against sanctuary jurisdictions does not, in itself, alter the substantive removability of any individual noncitizen. However, the operational consequences, including a greater number of community arrests and collateral apprehensions of family members, may significantly change the practical landscape for noncitizens who are technically removable but are not yet in proceedings.

Fourth, the continuing absence of regularly published DHS enforcement statistics deprives the immigration bar, the public, and noncitizens themselves of basic information about who is being arrested and removed and on what grounds. Counsel should continue to request individualized A-file and Freedom of Information Act records in pending matters and should not rely on aggregate representations from administration officials in making case-specific decisions.

Fifth, asylum seekers and individuals with pending Form I-589 applications should be aware that, independent of the enforcement environment, the Board of Immigration Appeals has substantially altered the procedural landscape governing how I-589 applications may be deemed incomplete, abandoned, or pretermitted. In Matter of C-A-R-R-, 29 I&N Dec. 13 (BIA 2025), the BIA held that an Immigration Judge may deem an incomplete Form I-589 abandoned or waived where the applicant has been given an opportunity to cure, but also clarified that a supporting declaration is not a constituent part of the I-589 itself. In Matter of H-A-A-V-, 29 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 2025), the BIA held that an Immigration Judge may pretermit an application for asylum, withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), or protection under the Convention Against Torture where the factual allegations, even taken as true, do not establish prima facie eligibility for relief, without conducting a full evidentiary hearing. Together, these decisions, taken in conjunction with EOIR Policy Memorandum 25-28 (Apr. 11, 2025), have substantially increased the importance of careful, complete, and legally sufficient I-589 pleadings at the time of filing. Counsel should anticipate and prepare to oppose DHS motions to pretermit in every asylum matter.

The Law Offices of Grinberg & Segal, PLLC will continue to monitor enforcement and litigation developments affecting our clients across the immigration courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the federal courts.

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