Introduction

On May 11, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published an interim final rule (IFR) titled Signatures on Immigration Benefit Requests in the Federal Register. The rule, which becomes effective on July 10, 2026, amends 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A) to give U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicators explicit discretionary authority to either reject or deny a benefit request that the agency later determines was filed without a valid signature, even where the filing cleared intake at the USCIS Lockbox. See 91 Fed. Reg. 25479 (May 11, 2026) (Docket No. USCIS‐2026‐0166; RIN 1615‐AD17). The most consequential operational change is unmistakable: where USCIS denies a request on signature grounds, the agency may retain the filing fee, treat the application as fully adjudicated, and deem the applicant ineligible for the requested benefit.

Although DHS frames the rule as a codification of policy that has been in place since 2018, the practical effect on practitioners and applicants is significant. The IFR shifts the locus of risk from the intake stage, where a defect produces a returned packet and refunded fee, to the adjudication stage, where the same defect may produce a denial with no refund and, depending on the form, a forfeited priority date or missed statutory deadline. This article examines the regulatory amendment, its statutory foundation, the policy history that culminated in this codification, the limited exception for certificate of citizenship applications, and the practical implications for benefit requestors and immigration counsel. It also addresses the open comment period, which runs concurrently with the effective date and closes July 10, 2026.

The Regulatory Amendment

The IFR revises 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A) by replacing the existing language with three subparagraphs. The new text provides, in relevant part:

  1. Every form, benefit request, or other document that requires a signature must be submitted with a valid signature.
  2. If USCIS accepts a benefit request and determines later that the request was not submitted with a valid signature, USCIS may reject or deny the request, except
  3. An Application for Certificate of Citizenship or Application for Citizenship and Issuance of Certificate Under Section 322 of the INA filed by an applicant seeking a certificate of citizenship may only be rejected if the only deficiency with the request is that it was not submitted with a valid signature.

91 Fed. Reg. at 25489. The regulatory text is brief, but the preamble extends across eleven pages of the Federal Register and supplies the interpretive framework the agency intends to apply. The key features are: (a) the discretionary nature of the authority, with adjudicators free to choose rejection or denial based on the facts of the individual case; (b) the express linkage between denial and fee retention, which DHS justifies under INA § 286(m), 8 U.S.C. § 1356(m); and (c) the deliberate refusal to authorize any procedure to cure a defective signature once a filing has been accepted for processing.

Statutory Authority

DHS grounds the rule in three statutory provisions. Section 103(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), confers general rulemaking authority on the Secretary of Homeland Security to administer and enforce the immigration laws, an authority extended to USCIS by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107‐296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in part at 6 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). Section 287(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(b), provides specific authority to require signed declarations and certifications under penalty of perjury, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, in lieu of in-person oaths before an immigration officer. Finally, INA § 286(m), 8 U.S.C. § 1356(m), authorizes USCIS to set fees at a level sufficient to recover the full cost of providing adjudication and naturalization services.

The agency’s reliance on section 286(m) is the cornerstone of its fee-retention theory. DHS reasons that where USCIS has expended adjudicative resources reviewing a benefit request prior to discovering the signature defect, the filing fee has, in fact, paid for a service rendered. Codifying retention authority, in the agency’s view, simply confirms that USCIS may recoup costs already incurred. The preamble buttresses this argument with prior agency practice in analogous contexts, including the existing rule under 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(A)(1) that fees are not refunded when USCIS rejects an appeal filed by a person or entity not entitled to file it, and the April 29, 2026 IFR amending 8 C.F.R. § 106.2(c) to retain Form I‐589 asylum fees upon rejection. See 91 Fed. Reg. 22952 (Apr. 29, 2026).

The Policy Evolution from 2010 to 2026

USCIS has issued at least four distinct iterations of agency signature guidance over the past sixteen years, and the IFR explicitly acknowledges that this back-and-forth has produced both adjudicator confusion and inconsistent treatment of requestors. The January 19, 2010 memorandum (HQSCOP 70/6‐P), authored by Lauren Kielsmeier, provided that an application or petition lacking a proper signature would be rejected at receipt under 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(i) and the fee returned, but if the defect was discovered after receipting, USCIS could deny under 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(ii) for failure to establish eligibility.

The June 7, 2016 interim policy memorandum (PM‐602‐0134) departed from that approach. It directed that any filing with an invalid signature would be rejected and returned to the responsible party, but it conspicuously declined to address whether USCIS could deny a request for a deficient signature. That silence was filled by the February 15, 2018 policy memorandum (PM‐602‐0134.1), which announced for the first time that if USCIS accepted a request for adjudication and later determined the signature was deficient, USCIS would deny the request. The 2018 memorandum further specified that USCIS would not permit applicants to correct or cure an invalid signature, a position the new IFR cements at the regulatory level. The 2018 memorandum was incorporated into the USCIS Policy Manual on March 5, 2020 (Policy Alert PA‐2020‐07) and has remained operative ever since. See 1 USCIS‐PM B.2(A) (Feb. 3, 2026).

Two pandemic-era developments also factor into the regulatory landscape. On March 20, 2020, USCIS announced that it would accept forms bearing reproduced original signatures, meaning scanned, faxed, or photocopied images of an original wet-ink signature on the document. On July 25, 2022, USCIS made that flexibility permanent. The IFR preserves this accommodation: a scanned, copied, or faxed image of an originally signed benefit request remains a valid handwritten signature for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2). What the IFR does not permit, and never has, is the affixing of a signature image onto an unsigned document, which the agency views as fundamentally different from reproducing a single executed original.

What Constitutes a Valid Signature

Under USCIS policy and the form instructions adopted across most agency forms, a valid signature is generally any handwritten mark or sign made by the requestor (or, where applicable, a parent, legal guardian, or authorized representative of a corporate entity) that signifies knowledge and approval of the contents of the request and supporting documentation, and that attests under penalty of perjury that the information is true and correct. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2); 1 USCIS‐PM B.2(A). In limited circumstances, a secure electronic signature applied during guided e-filing or PDFi upload through myUSCIS is also valid. Electronic signatures are not, however, available for attorney-filed PDFi submissions.

The USCIS Lockbox, operated by JP Morgan as a financial agent of the Treasury Department, applies a narrow set of business rules at intake. A signature is treated as valid for Lockbox purposes if it is (1) handwritten, (2) located on the signature line, (3) a thumbprint, or (4) an X mark (with additional validation to confirm consistent use). An invalid signature for Lockbox purposes is one that is typewritten or missing entirely. Because the Lockbox cannot meaningfully compare signatures across filings, identify pasted images, or analyze the authority of the signatory, a wide range of defects pass through intake and become adjudicator problems.

The preamble identifies the categories of signature defects that the IFR is principally aimed at: (a) copied or pasted signature images affixed to multiple unsigned filings; (b) stamped signatures, except where expressly authorized by form instructions (for example, the limited stamped-signature authorization for blanket-designated civil surgeons on Form I‐693); (c) signatures applied by individuals lacking authority to sign on behalf of the requestor, such as attorneys, preparers, or interpreters; and (d) signatures generated by signature software programs. The USCIS Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) reports having adjudicated 758 appeals of denials based on copied signatures alone. In one case cited in the preamble, a single consulting firm filed approximately 3,000 Forms I‐140 bearing the same pasted signature image; in another, an authorized signatory signed a single blank sheet and had a subordinate paste the resulting image onto at least 20 Forms I‐129. The IFR is, in substantial part, a response to these mass-filing abuses.

The Discretionary Reject-or-Deny Framework

A central feature of the IFR is its preservation of adjudicator discretion to choose between rejection and denial when a signature defect is discovered post-acceptance. The preamble articulates rough decisional guideposts. Denial is presumptively appropriate where the adjudicator has already expended substantial time and resources on the request before identifying the defect, particularly where the defect reflects a pattern of practice rather than inadvertent error. Rejection may be more appropriate where the defect is identified quickly, before significant adjudicative effort, or where the circumstances suggest mere oversight. The discretion runs in only one direction: the IFR does not authorize denial in lieu of rejection at the Lockbox stage; intake-stage defects continue to produce rejection with fee refund.

DHS explicitly rejected an alternative under which adjudicators would be required to perform an early signature review of every assigned case to catch defects before substantial work was performed. The agency reasoned that with more than 11 million pending requests and 13 million filings received in FY 2025, mandatory front-end review would impose unsustainable burdens and would, in any event, reverse the burden that properly rests on the requestor to file a properly signed document. The IFR thus leaves the responsibility for compliance squarely with applicants and petitioners.

The Refusal to Permit Cure of Signature Defects

Perhaps the most consequential, and the most contested, design choice in the IFR is the agency’s refusal to provide any mechanism by which a benefit requestor may cure a signature defect after the filing has been accepted. The preamble draws a sharp doctrinal line between 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8), which permits an adjudicator to request additional evidence to fill missing initial evidence (and, by extension, to verify ambiguous signature authority), and 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii), which addresses threshold submission requirements. According to DHS, an invalid signature renders the filing unprepared for consideration at all; the case was never properly before the agency, and curative procedures applicable to mid-adjudication evidentiary gaps are inapposite.

The agency offers a compelling policy rationale grounded in the integrity of priority-date systems and statutory caps. If USCIS were to permit a requestor to cure a defective signature after filing, the deficient filing would have improperly secured a place in line ahead of properly signed filings, possibly capturing a cap-subject visa number or an earlier priority date to which a fully compliant applicant would otherwise be entitled. The agency adds, candidly, that it has anecdotal evidence of practitioners who submit a known bad signature so they can get their spot in the processing line with their plan being to fix it later. 91 Fed. Reg. at 25485 n.31. The IFR is designed to foreclose that practice. The trade-off, however, is severe for the inadvertently noncompliant applicant whose visa availability or filing deadline lapses during the months or years that pass before USCIS reviews the filing.

The Narrow Exception for N-600 and N-600K Applications

The IFR carves out a single, narrow exception for the Form N‐600 (Application for Certificate of Citizenship) and Form N‐600K (Application for Citizenship and Issuance of Certificate Under Section 322). For these two applications only, USCIS may deny on signature grounds only if the signature defect is the sole deficiency in the request. The justification lies in the one-application rule codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 320.5(c), 322.5(c), and 341.5(e): an applicant for a certificate of citizenship may file only one N‐600 or N‐600K, and once that application has been denied and the appeal period has expired, the applicant’s only avenue for reconsideration is a motion under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. A denial therefore has materially greater consequences for an N‐600 or N‐600K applicant than for, say, an I‐140 or I‐130 petitioner who may simply file a new petition.

Practitioners representing derivative citizens or beneficiaries seeking Section 322 certificates should take particular care with signature compliance, but they may take some comfort in knowing that the IFR preserves the rejection-only pathway when a signature defect coincides with no other ground of ineligibility. Where other grounds exist, the exception does not apply and the agency retains its full reject-or-deny discretion.

Fee Retention, Appeal Rights, and Comparative Burdens

The distinction between rejection and denial under the IFR has three principal operational consequences. First, a rejected filing produces a refund of the filing fee; a denied filing does not. Second, a denied request carries appeal rights under 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(ii), allowing the requestor to challenge the signature determination by filing a Form I‐290B (Notice of Appeal or Motion) at the current $800 filing fee. A rejected filing carries no appeal rights under 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(iii). Third, an adverse denial may, depending on the requestor’s circumstances, prompt the loss of derivative benefits attached to pendency, such as employment authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9), advance parole under 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(A), or deferred action protection in U visa contexts under 8 C.F.R. § 214.204(b)(2)(iii).

DHS reports the following five-year trend in signature-based denials: 300 in FY 2021, 436 in FY 2022, 727 in FY 2023, 1,545 in FY 2024, and 2,953 in FY 2025, yielding a five-year annual average of 1,192. The nearly tenfold increase between FY 2021 and FY 2025 is the empirical basis for the agency’s claim that the existing policy framework has been insufficient to deter improperly signed filings. The agency projects roughly 1,200 signature-based denials annually going forward. Whether those numbers continue to rise or stabilize after codification will be one of the early indicators of the rule’s effectiveness.

The Administrative Procedure Act Procedural Exception

DHS issued the rule as an interim final rule without prior notice and comment, invoking the procedural rule exception under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). The agency advances two principal arguments. First, the rule merely codifies an existing 2018 policy that has been operative for eight years and is reflected in the standard signature paragraph of nearly all USCIS form instructions; codification, the agency argues, imposes no new substantive obligations and does not change the substantive standard by which the agency evaluates immigration benefits requests. JEM Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Second, even if the rule imposes some additional burden on requestors (a new filing fee on resubmission, the opportunity cost of completing a new form), incidental burdens do not transform an otherwise procedural rule into a substantive one. James V. Hurson Assocs., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The strength of the procedural exception argument is not free from doubt. A denied applicant who loses an H‐1B cap selection, a priority date, or a one-year asylum filing window because of a pasted signature affixed by a third party may reasonably contend that the rule alters substantive rights to a degree sufficient to implicate the APA’s notice-and-comment policies. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011). On the other hand, DHS responds that the underlying signature requirement itself, not the regulation governing the consequences of noncompliance, is the operative source of any substantive burden, and that requirement has been in place since at least 1964. See 29 Fed. Reg. 11956 (Aug. 21, 1964). The agency is publishing the rule as an IFR with a request for comments through July 10, 2026, which provides the public with a meaningful opportunity to inform any future amendment, even if it does not satisfy formal pre-promulgation notice-and-comment obligations.

Case Law Foundations

The preamble invokes a substantial body of case law to justify the strict enforcement posture, much of which warrants attention from practitioners. Two cases stand out for their breadth. In Savane v. DHS, 164 F.4th 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third Circuit held that 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) requires the applicant or petitioner to certify under penalty of perjury that the benefit request and all evidence submitted with it, either at the time of filing or thereafter, is true and correct, and that failure to properly sign renders the requestor ineligible for the benefit. The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Injeti v. USCIS, 737 F.3d 311, 318 (4th Cir. 2013), holding that the signature and certification requirement is necessary to facilitate USCIS’ assessment of eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals has likewise held that an alien’s signature on an immigration application establishes a strong presumption that he or she knows the contents of the application and has assented to them. Matter of Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496, 499 (BIA 2018); see also Gui Cun Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 529, 534 (3d Cir. 2004).

The preamble also invokes criminal authorities to underscore the integrity interests at stake, including United States v. Jimenez, 972 F.3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir. 2020), which affirmed an immigration fraud conviction premised on forged employer signatures on Forms I‐140 and supporting documents. A countervailing decision worth noting is Abusamhadaneh v. Taylor, 873 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687‐88 (E.D. Va. 2012), in which the district court reversed a USCIS denial of naturalization where the applicant’s failure to disclose an organizational affiliation was attributable to an attorney-preparer who signed and erroneously advised the applicant. While Abusamhadaneh is not invoked as an exonerating principle by DHS, the case is a useful reminder that signature attribution can cut both ways when the conduct of an attorney or preparer is implicated.

Practical Considerations for Practitioners and Applicants

The IFR has immediate operational implications for immigration counsel, particularly those who handle high-volume practice areas such as employment-based petitions, family-based filings, and humanitarian forms with statutory deadlines. The following considerations should inform internal compliance protocols.

Strict wet-ink intake protocols. Although USCIS permits scanned, faxed, or photocopied reproductions of an originally signed document, the original must exist as a discrete wet-ink execution of the actual filing. Counsel should institute file-level documentation confirming that the underlying signed instrument exists, that it bears the requestor’s wet-ink signature on the executed form (not on a blank sheet later transposed), and that the copy submitted to USCIS is a true and accurate reproduction. For petitioners signing many filings, a serialized acknowledgment log can rebut any later inference of pasted reproduction.

Avoidance of any signature software workflow. The preamble identifies signatures generated by signature software programs as a category of invalid signature, alongside copied images and stamps. Practitioners using DocuSign, Adobe Sign, or similar platforms for client execution should ensure that such platforms are used only to produce a paginated wet-ink-equivalent output where USCIS form instructions specifically permit electronic signature, and that the executed signature appears handwritten on the actual form, not as a typed text-block or system-generated mark.

Special care for cap-subject and deadline-sensitive filings. H‐1B cap petitions, U visa filings subject to statutory caps under 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2), VAWA self-petitions subject to the deadlines in INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC), labor certification-based I‐140 filings subject to the 180-day window under 20 C.F.R. § 656.30, and one-year asylum filings subject to INA § 208(a)(2)(B) deserve particular scrutiny. Where a denial would foreclose the substantive benefit, the cost of the signature error is no longer merely a lost filing fee; it is the loss of the underlying immigration relief. For asylum filings, counsel should also consider whether a denied filing on signature grounds preserves the extraordinary circumstances argument under INA § 208(a)(2)(D) for any late refiling.

Signatory authority on corporate filings. Petitions filed by corporate or organizational requestors must be signed by an individual with authority to bind the entity. A signature applied by an HR representative without documented authority, or by an outside consultant, will be treated as invalid. Internal corporate authorization records, board resolutions, or signed delegations of authority should be retained and produced upon request for evidence.

Children, incapacitated adults, and guardians. Where a parent signs on behalf of a child under fourteen or a legal guardian signs for an incapacitated adult, counsel should retain documentary evidence of the signatory’s authority, including birth records, custody orders, or guardianship instruments. The IFR preserves the agency’s authority under the 2016 memorandum to issue a Request for Evidence on signatory authority, and the documentation should be ready before, not after, the filing.

Appellate strategy after denial. If USCIS denies a request on signature grounds, the only mechanisms for challenge are an appeal on Form I‐290B (where the form type provides for AAO review) or a motion to reopen or reconsider under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Given that the agency’s stated position is that signature defects render the filing improperly before the agency, appellate counsel should focus on factual disputes about whether the signature was, in fact, defective rather than on equitable arguments for cure. Documentary evidence supporting the validity and provenance of the original signature, including affidavits from the signatory and the preparer, will be central.

Disclosure to clients. Counsel should consider updating engagement materials and pre-filing disclosures to inform clients of the heightened risk profile under the IFR, including the loss of the filing fee in the event of a post-acceptance signature denial. For clients whose primary motivation is preserving an early priority date, the consequences of a defective signature on a placeholder filing should be made explicit in writing.

The Comment Period

Although the rule takes effect July 10, 2026, the same date marks the close of the public comment period. Written comments may be submitted through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at regulations.gov, referencing DHS Docket No. USCIS‐2026‐0166. Comments are most likely to influence post-promulgation amendment if they address specific aspects of the rule, identify operational problems with concrete examples, and propose alternative language. Areas where comment may be particularly valuable include: (a) the appropriateness of fee retention where the post-acceptance review occurs years after filing due to backlogs unrelated to the requestor’s conduct; (b) the absence of any cure procedure for inadvertent, single-instance errors that are facially distinguishable from the mass-filing abuses motivating the rule; and (c) the case for expanding the N‐600/N‐600K exception to other one-application contexts where denial has disproportionate consequences.

Conclusion

The Signatures IFR is best understood not as a substantive policy shift but as a regulatory hardening of an enforcement posture that has been in place since 2018. By moving the authority to deny improperly signed filings from policy memorandum to regulatory text, and by codifying the discretion to retain filing fees, DHS has signaled that the era of mass copy-and-paste filings is over and that mid-adjudication signature surprises will not be cured by post-hoc evidentiary supplementation. For the careful practitioner, compliance has always been the path of least resistance; the IFR raises the cost of every deviation. For the inadvertently noncompliant or poorly counseled applicant, the consequences of a signature defect have become substantially more severe.

The Law Offices of Grinberg & Segal, PLLC, will continue to monitor implementation of the rule and any judicial challenges that may emerge during the comment period and beyond. For specific case-level questions about signature compliance, fee retention, or appellate strategy following a signature-based denial, readers should consult an experienced immigration attorney. The full text of the rule is published at 91 Fed. Reg. 25479 (May 11, 2026), and the corresponding docket is available at regulations.gov under Docket No. USCIS‐2026‐0166.