Understanding Matter of J-A-N-M- (2025)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has just issued a far-reaching decision that sharply limits what Immigration Judges (IJs) can do in “withholding-only” proceedings—cases that arise after a previously deported person reenters the United States and expresses fear of persecution or torture. 

In Matter of J-A-N-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 287 (BIA 2025), the Board ruled that IJs cannot terminate or administratively close such proceedings for equitable or humanitarian reasons, even when a person is pursuing a U-visa or other humanitarian relief before U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 

Preface: Historical Overview of Termination and Administrative Closure in Withholding-Only Proceedings

Early Development of Administrative Closure 

The practice of administrative closure originated in the 1980s as a case-management tool for Immigration Judges (IJs) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The mechanism allowed cases to be removed from an active calendar without a final order of removal when another event—such as a pending visa petition or criminal proceeding—was expected to affect the outcome. 

One of the earliest BIA references to administrative closure was Matter of Amico, 19 I. & N. Dec. 652 (B.I.A. 1988), where the Board described administrative closure as an “administrative convenience” for docket control but emphasized that it should not be used to avoid adjudication where the respondent failed to appear. 

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, administrative closure became widely used for practical efficiency—often to await adjudication of collateral immigration benefits or the outcome of state court matters. 

Expansion and Institutionalization 

By the early 2010s, administrative closure had become a major component of EOIR docket management. The BIA formally expanded its permissible use in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012). In Avetisyan, the Board held that Immigration Judges have authority to administratively close a case even over the objection of one of the parties, provided the judge considered factors such as the likelihood of collateral relief, the anticipated duration of closure, and the interests of both parties and the public. 

This decision confirmed that administrative closure was not solely dependent on the consent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It also effectively institutionalized administrative closure as an accepted tool for docket management and equitable case handling. 

The 2018 Reversal: Matter of Castro-Tum 

The broad use of administrative closure came under sharp criticism in 2018 when the Attorney General issued Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018). There, Attorney General Jeff Sessions concluded that neither the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) nor its implementing regulations grant Immigration Judges or the BIA general authority to administratively close cases. 

The Attorney General found that the practice had expanded well beyond its intended case-management purpose and was inconsistent with the statutory obligation to decide cases promptly. As a result, Castro-Tum sharply curtailed the availability of administrative closure except where expressly authorized by regulation, settlement agreement, or specific delegation. 

This decision effectively suspended the practice in most contexts, though some circuits later disagreed with the Attorney General’s restrictive reading, restoring closure authority within their jurisdictions. 

Termination Distinguished from Administrative Closure 

While related, termination is distinct from administrative closure. Termination formally ends a removal proceeding, while administrative closure merely pauses it without a final order. 

Historically, termination was used in limited situations: where charges were legally defective, where DHS moved to dismiss, or where jurisdiction was lacking. The BIA recognized that termination was a final adjudicative act, not a docket-management measure. 

In recent years, however, IJs have been asked to use termination as a humanitarian or equity-based measure, particularly to allow respondents to pursue collateral benefits before USCIS. This expanded use has been controversial and has been restricted by subsequent case law and regulation. 

The Special Case of Withholding-Only Proceedings 

“Withholding-only” proceedings arise when a noncitizen who has been previously removed reenters the United States unlawfully and expresses a fear of persecution or torture. DHS reinstates the prior removal order under INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). Under the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i), Immigration Judges’ jurisdiction in such cases “shall be limited to a determination of whether the alien is eligible for withholding or deferral of removal,” and “all parties are prohibited from raising or considering any other issues, including … eligibility for any other form of relief.” 

Because these proceedings exist solely to comply with the United States’ non-refoulement obligations, all other discretionary relief under the INA is barred. The Supreme Court confirmed this limitation in Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006), holding that § 241(a)(5) prevents an individual subject to reinstatement from seeking discretionary relief under the Act. 

Later, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021), described withholding-only proceedings as “narrowly focused” and entirely distinct from ordinary removal proceedings. The Fifth Circuit echoed this understanding in Ruiz-Perez v. Garland, 49 F.4th 972 (5th Cir. 2022), emphasizing that the scope of such proceedings is strictly confined to the question of protection eligibility. 

The 2025 Clarification: Matter of J-A-N-M- 

In the case we discuss now, Matter of J-A-N-M-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 287 (B.I.A. 2025), the BIA resolved an emerging dispute over whether an IJ could grant discretionary termination of withholding-only proceedings. The IJ in that case had terminated proceedings to allow the respondent, a Honduran national with a reinstated order, to pursue a U-visa application with USCIS. The Board held that such termination is not permitted, reasoning that § 1208.2(c)(3)(i) explicitly limits the IJ’s authority to deciding only withholding or deferral of removal. Because that regulation bars consideration of “any other issues,” the general termination provision in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(d)(2)(ii) cannot be used to override it. The Board further noted that individuals with reinstated orders may still pursue U-visa relief directly with USCIS under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(1), without need for termination of EOIR proceedings. 

The Doctrinal Summary 

The development of administrative closure and termination authority in immigration law shows a steady narrowing of Immigration Judges’ discretion:

  1. 1980s–2012: Administrative closure developed as a pragmatic, judge-made docket tool (Matter of Amico; Matter of Avetisyan).
  2. 2018: The Attorney General in Castro-Tum reined in that discretion, emphasizing statutory limits.
  3. Post-2018: Some circuit courts partially revived closure authority, but only in ordinary removal proceedings.
  4. 2025: The BIA in Matter of J-A-N-M- definitively confirmed that in withholding-only proceedings, judges have no authority to grant termination or administrative closure.

Note of caution: This evolution demonstrates the distinction between EOIR’s case-management powers in general removal proceedings and the strictly confined jurisdiction in withholding-only contexts. 

Historic Practical Implications

  • Administrative closure and termination remain available only in limited situations explicitly authorized by regulation or precedent.
  • In withholding-only proceedings, IJs have no discretion to close or terminate cases; their authority extends solely to determining eligibility for withholding or deferral.
  • Collateral humanitarian benefits—such as U-visas, T-visas, or deferred action—must be pursued directly with USCIS or DHS outside the immigration court system.
  • Any attempt to seek termination in this posture may risk abandonment of protection claims and could leave the client with a reinstated final removal order.

Key Authorities:

  • Matter of Amico, 19 I. & N. Dec. 652 (B.I.A. 1988).
  • Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012).
  • Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018).
  • Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006).
  • Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021).
  • Ruiz-Perez v. Garland, 49 F.4th 972 (5th Cir. 2022).
  • Matter of J-A-N-M-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 287 (B.I.A. 2025).

Background of this Case 

The respondent, a citizen of Honduras, had been deported once before—his removal order dated back to 2006. Years later, he reentered the U.S. without permission. When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) discovered this, it reinstated the prior removal order under INA § 241(a)(5). 

After being apprehended, he told officers he feared returning to Honduras. A USCIS asylum officer found he had a reasonable fear of persecution or torture and referred his case to an IJ for withholding-only proceedings. This type of proceeding is strictly limited: the IJ can decide only whether the person qualifies for withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act or the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 

Before the IJ, the respondent:

  • Applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection; and
  • Asked the court to administratively close or terminate the case while he pursued a U-visa (for victims of qualifying crimes who assist law enforcement).

The IJ denied the protection claims on credibility grounds but, balancing equities, nevertheless granted discretionary termination under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(d)(2)(ii), reasoning that termination would allow the man to pursue his U-visa without interference from an active deportation case. 

DHS appealed the termination, arguing that the IJ lacked authority to do this. The respondent did not appeal the denial of withholding and CAT. 

The BIA faced a single question: 

Can an Immigration Judge exercise “discretionary termination” in withholding-only proceedings following reinstatement of a removal order? 

The Board’s Holding 

Answer: No.

The BIA ruled that IJs have no power to terminate withholding-only cases under the general termination regulation because another regulation—8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i)—expressly forbids it. 

The Board therefore vacated the IJ’s termination order, sustained DHS’s appeal, and reinstated the respondent’s final removal order.

The Reasoning Behind the Decision 

A. Reinstatement Bars Most Forms of Relief 

Section 241(a)(5) of the INA is uncompromising: when a person who was previously removed reenters without authorization, the old removal order is reinstated and the individual “is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter.” 

The Supreme Court in Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales (2006) confirmed that this provision cuts off access to discretionary relief such as adjustment, asylum, or cancellation of removal. Only limited protection claims, namely, withholding or deferral of removal, remain available as a matter of compliance with international non-refoulement obligations. 

B. Withholding-Only Proceedings Are Extremely Narrow 

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(c)(3)(i), once a case is referred for withholding-only proceedings, the IJ’s jurisdiction “shall be limited to a determination of whether the alien is eligible for withholding or deferral of removal.” It further states that “all parties are prohibited from raising or considering any other issues, including but not limited to issues of admissibility, deportability, or eligibility for any other form of relief.” 

The Board emphasized that this language leaves no discretion for IJs to entertain collateral matters such as termination, administrative closure, or continuances for unrelated relief. Federal courts—including the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez (2021) and the Fifth Circuit in Ruiz-Perez v. Garland (2022)—have likewise recognized the tightly circumscribed nature of withholding-only proceedings. 

C. Why the IJ’s Reliance on § 1003.18(d)(2)(ii) Fails 

The regulation the IJ relied upon allows termination “for good cause,” but its next paragraph—§ 1003.18(d)(2)(iii)—explicitly warns that nothing in that section authorizes termination “where prohibited by another regulatory provision.” Because § 1208.2(c)(3)(i) prohibits consideration of anything other than withholding or deferral, the IJ’s action conflicted with that rule. The more specific regulation controls. 

D. U-Visa Filings Can Proceed Without Termination 

The Board also noted that the respondent did not need to be terminated to apply for a U visa. Under existing USCIS regulations (8 C.F.R. § 214.14), a person with a final order of removal may still file a U-visa petition and even request a stay of removal. Thus, the IJ’s attempt to “clear the way” was unnecessary and contrary to the regulatory scheme.

Effect on the Respondent’s Protection Claims 

Because the respondent failed to appeal the IJ’s adverse credibility finding and denial of withholding/CAT, those rulings now stand. The BIA noted that by seeking termination rather than pursuing the protection claims, he effectively abandoned them. Consequently, the reinstated removal order remains in full effect. 

Broader Implications

A. No “Equitable Escape Hatch” 

This case removes any doubt: Immigration Judges cannot use discretionary termination or administrative closure to delay or end withholding-only proceedings. Their only function in such cases is to decide whether the applicant meets the standard for withholding or deferral of removal. 

B. Limited Avenues for Reinstated Entrants 

People with reinstated orders who fear persecution now face an even narrower procedural path. They may obtain protection only by winning withholding or CAT before the IJ. Other benefits—U-visas, T-visas, family petitions, or adjustment of status—must be handled entirely outside EOIR, through USCIS or DHS prosecutorial discretion. 

C. Strategy for Practitioners 

Lawyers representing clients in withholding-only status should:

  1. Focus on the merits of the withholding/CAT claim; no other relief is available in that forum.
  2. Coordinate with USCIS for any humanitarian petitions, without expecting EOIR to pause or close the case.
  3. Avoid requesting termination that could be construed as waiving the client’s only available protection claim.
  4. Preserve appeals of any adverse protection rulings, since failure to appeal leaves the removal order final and executable.

D. Interaction with Deferred Action and Stays 

The decision does not prevent DHS from exercising prosecutorial discretion—for example, deferring removal or granting a stay while a U-visa is pending—but such actions are solely within DHS authority, not the IJ’s.

The Board’s Closing Warning 

As in many BIA decisions, the opinion ends by reminding respondents that willfully failing to depart or obstructing removal may result in civil fines up to $998 per day and potential criminal prosecution for illegal reentry under INA § 276.

Key Takeaways

  • Only two outcomes exist in withholding-only cases: grant or deny protection.
  • No termination, no administrative closure, no continuances for collateral relief.
  • U-visa or other applications must proceed through USCIS while the removal order remains active.
  • Reinstated entrants are legally ineligible for “relief under the Act,” only for limited protection against return.
  • Appeals must be preserved promptly to avoid unreviewable final orders.

Conclusion 

Matter of J-A-N-M- reinforces a strict divide between EOIR’s limited protective role and USCIS’s humanitarian-relief programs. It underscores that Immigration Judges in withholding-only proceedings act under an extraordinarily narrow jurisdiction. For practitioners, the message is clear: build the best possible record for withholding or CAT protection, pursue any ancillary relief directly with DHS or USCIS, and do not expect the immigration court to grant termination for convenience or fairness.